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PREFATORY NOTE 
The Area Studies Programs within the International Programs Office 
of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst initiated in 1976 a series 
of Occasional papers to provide an outlet for both informal and formal 
scholarly works of a generci interest to the University community. In 
1978 the first numbers in this series devoted to issues and themes related 
to Asia were introduced under the sponsorship of the Asian Studies Com­
mittee at the University. The initial three papers deal with topics in 
Japan, China and Laos. In future papers topics will be presented which 
encompass the major regions of Asia; East Asia (China, Japan, Korea); 
South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka); and Southeast Asia 
(Burma;- Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam). Comments on the individual papers and the entire 
series are welcome and encouraged. 
Professor Stephen E. Pe1z is Associate Professor of History at the 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He has worked in Japanese dip­
lomatic and military archives and has published a book titled Race to 
Pearl Harbor: The Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World 
War II (Harvard, 1974) for which he was named cowinner of the Bernath 
prize of the Society for the History of American Foreign Relations. 
In this paper Professor Pe1z reviews the historical 1iterqture on 
Japanese imperialism in the 1930s and argues that a new consensus has 
developed: Japan adopted imperialism as a defense against western pres­
sure. He then proceeds to revise this view by exploring the motives of 
four men who pushed Japan down the road to empire at critica1'moments, 
and he concludes that Japan's imperial impulse came from within Japan 
itself. Japanese military leaders believed that it was their duty to use 
modern weapons and new planning methods to create an empire which would 
embody and expand traditicna1 oriental values and social arrangements, and 
he argues that their combined idealism and militarism made them partic­
ularly dangerous to world order. Japanese imperialism, then, was a spec­
ial variant in the history of imperial expansion. 
THE GOOD EMPIRE: JAPAN I S NEW ORDER AT HOME AND ABROAD 
He who cares neither about his life, nor about his fame, nor about 
rank or money--such a man is hard to deal with •••• Yet it is only such 
a man who will undergo every hardship withhis companions in order to 
carry out great work for the country. 
saigo Takamori 
Saigo Takamori, one of the leaders of the Meiji Restoration, hated 
the new era which he had helped to create, for modernization required 
the end of the samurai and the rise of businessmen. To save his class 
and to preserve the unique Japanese virtues which the warriors embodied, 
he demanded that the new government give them the main role in Japan's 
rise to international dignity and power; in 1873 he proposed to lead the 
conquest of Korea, and when his colleagues in the government rejected 
his plan, he led a suicidal rebellion. By the end of the century, he 
had become a national hero, whose personal sacrifice inspired Japan's 
soldiers in their successful Korean and Chinese adventures. During the 
first years of Meiji, however, international success seemed far less 
certain; consequently, Okubo Toshimichi and the other realistic leaders 
had suffered from constant tension. 
They were confident that their country was spiritually strong--that 
Japan was a good society--but at the same time they feared that Japan was 
militarily vu1nerab1~ to the western powers whose ships cruised along 
their shores. By the 1930's, the reverse was true. The western warships 
were gone, and many Japanese leaders had forgotten their fears of mi1i­
tary weakness. Between 1931 and 1938, Japan broke with the Wilsonian 
international order of the twenties and set out to build a great empire. 
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But at the same time, many of Japan's leaders began to doubt their coun­
try's spiritual strength and social stability. Admirals Kato Kanji and 
Suetsugu Nobumasa, General Koiso Kuniaki, and Lieutenant General Ishiwara 
Kanji all feared that westernization would undermine the traditional 
beliefs which they valued most. They met the challenge to Japan's nation­
al tradition by trying to restore order at home, build a good empire in 
Asia, and synthesize the best elements of eastern and western culture. 
The Problem of Japanese Imperialism 
Japanese foreign policy during the thirties has puzzled many scholars 
in the past, and sad to say, may continue to do so even after this article 
appears. Much of the work done on the subject since World War II has 
dealt with the conditions which made expansion possible: the political 
strength of the Japanese military and the weakness of their domestic 
opponents; assassinations by the radical right; the fragmented decision­
making process; the West's economic troubles, its military weakness, its 
diplomatic confusions, and the rise of European totalitarian regimes and 
Chinese nationalism. l Three schools of interpreters have gone beyond 
these boundary conditions to examine the underlying motives of the Japan­
ese leaders themselves: the conspiracy advocates, the Maruyama school, 
and the revisionists. 
The conspiracy thesis has attracted both the prosecutors at the 
Tokyo war crimes trial and orthodox Marxist historians, a rather strange 
set of bedfellows. Both of these groups imply that an over-riding sel­
fishness drove the Japanese armies across Asia. The prosecutors at the 
Tokyo trial argued that the Japanese leaders, like the Nazis, were crim­
inal representatives of an evil society who decided to expand their 
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arbitrary power not only in Japan, but throughout the world. The Marxist 
writers added that this selfishness was inevitable, since Japan's leaders 
were driven by the class dilemmas of modern capitalism. 
In spite of occasional reincarnations, the conspiracy thesis has 
faded from favor among more recent writers, probably because it is so 
unsatisfying as an explanation of human action. Many writers have pointed 
out that Japan's leaders were neither criminal nor self-seeking; in fact, 
they served their governments at considerable personal risk, and unlike 
Hitler, they yielded their posts when their policies failed. Far from 
acting as agents of Japanese industry, they despised self-seeking capi­
talists and hoped to restore prosperity to Japan and Asia in spite of 
zaibatsu leaders. 2 As time has passed, then, Japan's leaders have come 
3to seem more complicated than the villains in a grade B movie. 
Maruyama Masao, a political scientist at Tokyo University, has given 
a more complex explanation of the motives of Japan's imperialists. He 
argues that they were nationalists who had a strong sense of mission, but 
a weak sense of self. Like most Japanese in the thirties, Maruyama implies, 
Japan's military and civilian leaders lacked the strength of character to 
stand up for democracy at home or to resist the actions of the young 
officers and radical nationalists. Because they were oppressed by Japan's 
hierarchical society, Maruyama says, they transferred tyranny abroad. 
Since they were raiseq to regard loyalty as the central core of value and 
to regard themselves as the Emperor's most loyal servants, they believed 
that they could do no wrong. Consequently, their efforts to reform for­
eign peoples merely reproduced the autocratic forms of Japanese domestic 
relations across Asia. In the end, Japan's leaders lost control of 
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policy, became the "robots" of the radical right, and clanked onward to 
destruction. 4 In Maruyama's eyes then, they were not really selfish, but 
rather members of a bumbling generation who were driven by the evil nature 
of their society. 
In contrast to these rather dark visions, Akira Iriye and James B. 
Crowley have proposed a clearly revisionist interpretation. While Iriye 
does not deny that Japan's leaders misread the changing international 
scene, he stresses external factors as the cause of Japan's shift from 
international cooperation to aggression. The Japanese military correctly 
concluded that the Washington treaties had failed to provide a framework 
for peaceful economic expansion and stable relations with China and Russia. 
Consequently, Japan's leaders believed that they had to impose a new order 
in Asia, but found, once again, that the western powers were blocking 
their way. Thus, Iriye concludes that the reasons for Japan's expansion 
lie not only in "the pathology of the Japanese mind," but also in the 
"inherent contradictions and irrationalities of the modern world."S 
Though the military took the wrong road, Iriye implies that Japan abso­
lutely had to do something to tame the chaotic international scene. 
James B. Crowley goes much further than Iriye in arguing for the 
rationality of Japan's leaders. These men, he says,were seeking the 
traditional goals of the Meiji genro: national security, economic pro­
gress, and equality ~ith the leading western nations. In order to achieve 
security, the Japanese had to assume a hegemonial position in East Asia; 
an Asian bloc of economic and military allies would give them the ability 
to fight a long war of attrition against America or Russia. And even if 
war did not come, Japan would be able to compete successfully with the 
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other closed economic systems by controlling large markets. Crowley 
argues that these rational military leaders were able to control policy 
until the fall of 1937, when civilians like Konoye, Hirota, and Hiranuma 
took over the direction of the China incident and expanded it into a 
holy war, thereby breaching the reasonable strategic limits which the 
military had set. Revision has come full circle: for most of the 
thirties, Crowley implies, Japan's leaders were typical members of a for­
eign policy elite which seeks security for its country in competition 
with the elites of other lands. This rational portrait of Japanese im­
perialism has led to a basic re-eva1uation of American responsibility for 
the outbreak of the pacific war. James MacGregor Burns voices the new 
consensus when he refers to the Japanese-American war as a miscalculated 
conflict. Since the Japanese were only seeking a limited Asian sphere 
and were not trying to conquer the world, they were no threat to American 
security, and they only went to war with the United States reluctantly 
6
after the Americans cut off their oil in July 1941.
At first glance, Japan's position in the world during the early 
thirties does indeed seem insecure, and the fears of Japan's leaders seem 
justified. Economically, tariff barriers were rising. Militarily, Russia 
was recovering from the effects of the revolution, while the Anglo-Saxon 
powers were insisting on maintaining their combined naval predominance. 
Diplomatically, the growing nationalist and communist movements in China 
vied with each other in campaigning against Japan's special interests on 
the continent. An over-riding concern for security seems rational enough 
given these circumstances. 
Yet a closer look yields a sharply contrasting picture. Economically, 
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Japan was one of the first countries to recover from the depression, and 
her foreign trade expanded in spite of tariff walls. Militarily, the 
Japanese were more secure in the early thirties than they had been at any 
time previously; in fact, Japan had the most balanced military force in 
the world. Russia had a larger army, but no navy to speak of, while 
America and Britain had larger navies, but minuscule standing armies. 
Given the isolated geographic position of Japan's home islands, the mil­
itary could point to no clear and present military threat to the homeland. 
Diplomatically, the thirties were even kinder to Japan than the twenties. 
The rise of fascist regimes in Italy and Germany increasingly pinned 
England and Russia in Europe, while the depression hardened the hearts of 
America's isolationists in Congress against military spending and foreign 
7 
entanglements. Left alone in Northeast Asia, Japan's leaders should 
have had no difficulty protecting their continental possessions and home 
islands from the weak and isolated Chinese or the preoccupied Russians. 
And, in fact, Japan's leaders saw more opportunity than danger in the 
international chaos of the thirties. 
At first glance Crowley also seems correct when he argues that the 
responsible officials in Tokyo controlled Japanese foreign policy in a 
rational fashion, at least until 1937. The government did set Japan's 
foreign policy goals in a series of cabinet papers between 1933 and 1936. 
But Mark Pea ttie has .:shown that Japanese colonels in the field could 
sometimes have a decisive effect on the policy itself. And even the 
style of Japanese decision-making introduced fundamental irrationalities 
into Japanese foreign policy. Consider the way in which Japan's leaders 
made their decisions in the thirties. Each of the major interest groups 
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appealed to the Imperial court functionaries and to Prince Saionji 
Kimmocbi, tbe surviving genro, to adopt their programs. Tbe imperial 
advisors would then foster negotiations among the competing groups in 
order to arrive at a consensus; when such a consensus appeared, the 
Emperor would ratify it as national policy.8 The easiest way to arrive 
at a consensus was to adopt all of tbe basic goals of the most powerful 
groups, in spite of the fact that tbe Empire might lack the means to 
achieve them simultaneously. 
The balance of forces in this bargaining process increasingly tilted 
toward the more radical military elements as the decade progressed. The 
Army and Navy provoked foreign crises, used the media which they controlled 
to demand harsh measures, and appealed to their many supporters through­
out the country; meanwhile, the political parties saw their power wane 
throughout the decade, although they were able to block some of the more 
9 
radical proposals of the military by footdragging in Parliament. With 
commanders in the field acting semi-independently, and with this confused 
process of decision going on in Tokyo, Japan's ambitions naturally out­
stripped its reach. Another factor helped to insure that Japan would 
follow an aggressive course in world affairs: the activities of the 
angry men of the early Showa period. By exploring the backgrounds and 
activities of four of these determined advocates of expansion, we can 
gain a clearer unders,;tanding of the motives which drove Japanese leaders 
to seek a new empire. 
Men of Tradition and Character 
In order to understand what inspired Kato, Suetsugu, Koiso, and 
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Ishiwara to advocate expansion abroad and reform at home, we must con­
sider their early years, because for them the youth was father to the man 
in a special way_ All of them were born between 1870 and 1889; therefore, 
between 1890 and 1920 they witnessed almost unbroken economic and imperial 
progress. With the exception of Ishiwara, all of them fought with the 
10victorious forces during the Russo-Japanese war. To them, therefore, 
expansion and modernization marched shoulder to shoulder. 
The four boys also shared a common social background. With the 
exception of Suetsugu, their fathers or grandfathers were samurai. As 
a result, they received a special moral training which shaped both their 
careers and Japan's policies in later years. As Robert B4fuh has pointed 
out, the values which they learned at home grew into a national ideology 
by the thirties when appeals for national sacrifice drew a strong response 
from the country at large. In 1937 the Ministry of Education summed up 
this official doctrine in the famous Fundamentals of National Polity: 
western individualism led to the deadends of capitalism, anarchism, and 
socialism, while the Imperial way of loyalty and filial piety produced 
11 
harmony and peace. 
At the heart of this central Japanese value system lay the concept 
of on, the duty to repay benevolence received from one's parents, from 
one's immediate master, and most important, from heaven, as represented 
by the Emperor. The samurai's duty was twofold: If his master's realm 
was threatened, he would die in its defence, thereby achieving salvation; 
if placed in a position of power, he would serve as an example to the 
rest of the state's citizens by working hard, living frugally and by treat­
ing his inferiors with benevolence, while insisting on righteous action 
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by those above. In the Meiji years, the Emperor became the ultimate 
focus of the citizens' feelings of loyalty; for the good soldier and 
faithful citizen, then, the proper goal of all action was to help expand 
the Emperor's benevolence by insuring the progress of the state. Each 
member of the nation would work hard, live frugally, and contribute 
what he could to building a better Japan. If all sincerely did their 
duty, none would become too wealthy, and all classes would live in har­
12 
mony. Such, then, was the ideal which crystanized while our protagon­
ists were growing up. 
As young officers, our protagonists drank in this ethic at home, on 
the drill field, and at school. Their fathers lived lives of service, 
first as han officials and then as government bureaucrats or officers in 
the Meiji military and police forces. At the lower military schools, the 
boys received an education which consisted mostly of rigorous spiritual 
toughening and technical military training. The path to adulthood was 
not always smooth and straight; Ishiwara Kanji was suspended twice for 
kicking his sabre instructor "in the vitals," a grievous rebellion against 
• . 13h1S super10r. 
In spite of occasional revolw, this moral training struck deep roots. 
Throughout his career, Kato Kanji repeatedly stressed the need for the 
soldiers to have a firm set of traditional beliefs, no matter how much 
modern knowledge they might possess. For Kato, the virtue of mutual 
loyalty lay at the base of all Japanese values, for it united superior 
and inferior in bonds ofben~olence and mutual affection. Such loyalty 
was the core of bushido, the warrior code which Kato recommended as a 
cure for the distractions of the modern era. If the good Japanese followed 
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the true way, he would aid the weak, revere justice, and prize honor, all 
in a spirit of self-sacrifice. The First World War was a sign from 
Heaven, Kato said, that the materialistic culture of the west had reached 
a moral impasse and that Japan was the true, spiritual nation which had 
a duty to extend its healing national ethic. Ishiwara agreed. In his 
overview of war history he wrote, " ••• should we not drill into our­
selves •. a profound belief in the kokutai [national essence] which must 
be the driving force of that spirit by which a soldier, like a god, sac­
rifices himself sincerely for his lord's country?,,14 
Naturally throughout their lives, all of these men acted the part 
of the loyal samurai. But their conception of their role blended two 
conflicting models of samurai behavior: the loyal retainer [kashin] and 
the man of determination [shishi}. For most of their careers, they worked 
within the system and rose steadily through the new military bureaucracies. 
They were all good students who were selected early in their careers for 
the General Staffs of their respective services, and all became military 
intellectuals associated with the War Colleges. Often they advanced 
under the patronage of a famous superior; for example, Admiral Togo 
Heihachiro was as in~rumental in KatD's career as Kato was in Suetsugu's 
progress. Loyal service had real, as well as spiritual rewards. 
But at critical periods in their careers and at major turning points 
in the history of Japan's foreign relations, these men broke out of 
normal channels and demanded that the nation change direction. And they 
acted not as robots of the radical right or young officers, but on their 
own and in spite of possible damage to their futures. A good man was 
selfless; he shunned all desire for wealth and recognition, while 
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serving his Emperor and nation. But what was his duty when things were 
not going well? Then he had to revolt on behalf of the right policies, 
even though he might fail, for his action would shame his superiors into 
doing the right thing. Those who actually did revolt were few, but they 
could be sure of an honored place in Japan's historical memory, for they 
had exhibited makoto--sincere self-denial, purity, and unplanned, headlong 
action for the good of others. lS If such men failed, they might still 
have the comforting thought that their superiors would eventually adopt 
the policies for which they had sacrificed. Often, however, they could 
hope to induce their superiors to reflect and adopt their policies immed­
iately; in such cases, a promotion for the offender might result. Vigor­
ous advocacy, then, had both rewards and dangers; some of our protagonists 
went on to promotions while others went into political exile. 
Take as an example Admiral Kato Kanji. In 1930 Kato was Chief of 
the Navy General Staff. During the naval disarmament crisis of 1930, 
he turned his back on political preferment to follow a course of rugged 
independence. Kato feared that the politicians in London were bargaining 
away Japan's existing margin of naval security and more important, its 
hopes for further greatness. Through his aide, Suetsugu, he declared 
publicly that the Chief of the Naval General Staff was directly respon­
sible to the Emperor for determining how much naval construction Japan 
needed. The politicians, Suetsugu said, were tampering with this right 
of supreme command. When Kato finally found himself outmaneuvered by 
Prime Minister Hamaguchi, he-resigned in protest. Kato's official career 
had ended, and Suetsugu's rise halted temporarily.16 
KOLSO Kuniaki and Ishiwara Kanji also acted with determination when 
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they thought the nation was endangered. In 1930 Major General Koiso, the 
Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, involved him­
self with the March plotters, who hoped to establish a military govern­
ment by coup d'etat. In the mid-thirties Koiso's political activities 
earned him a temporary exile from the seats of powe~ and Ishiwara was one 
of the leaders of the Kwantung Army during its independent action in 
Manchuria in 1931. In the mid-thirties he continued to intervene in 
politics and stand against the mainstream in foreign policy matters, 
until finally he too was exiled from Tokyo.17 When these men saw their 
country going wrong, they would act occasionally without regard to per­
sonal consequences. And in fact, they saw many dangers both abroad and 
at home. 
The Warring States 
Kato, Suetsugu, Koiso, and Ishiwara all believed that competition 
rather than cooperation was the underlying law of international relations, 
and they naturally concluded that the Washington system was both unreal­
istic and immoral. Advocates of disarmament ignored the fact that nations 
lived or died by the sword and that the nation which did not expand would 
soon be outstripped. And it seemed clear to these men that the paeans 
to peace sung by western politicians merely served to cover the harsh 
reality of capitalist exploitation in Asia. 
From 1918 on, many influential figures in Japan distrusted the 
Versailles and Washington systems. Men like Tokutomi Soho, Konoye 
Fumimaro, and Matsuoka Y~suke declared that the new Wilsonian order was 
merely a device to preserve the old imperialistic order, and Admiral Kato 
agreed. As a military expert at the Washington conference, Kato fought 
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so hard against establishing a 6/10 ratio between Japan and America that 
the politicians had to take the question out of the hands of the naval 
specialists' committee. In the mid-twenties, Kata used the occasion of 
a formal lecture to the Emperor on military affairs to explain his hatred 
of the naval treaties. KatS explained that the west was using the dis­
armament system to secure "capitalistic and imperialistic" domination of 
the Orient. In the early nineteenth century, he said, England and America 
had replaced Spain and Portugal as leaders in the eternal quest for 
empire in the Pacific. Japan, however, had entered the struggle late 
and had failed to resist America's advance from Hawaii and Guam right up 
to the Philippines which lay on Japan's very doorstep_ Then America and 
Britain had tied Japan's hands by freezing battleship competition and by 
fixing the territorial status quo. Yet war would eventually be inevitable, 
Kat~ concluded, since the urge to predominate was basic to human nature. lS 
Suetsugu agreed. In the mid-thirties he publicly explained that 
international politics resembled the warring states period in Japanese 
history--the years of feudal warfare before the reunification of the 
country under the Tokugawa. It was only natural, he said, that all nations 
sought their own interests at the expense of others and that war resulted. 
Military power was the key to life or death for a nation: '~in and you 
take the world; lose and your nation dies. There is no way around it." 
As victors in the mogt recent war, Suetsugu said, it was natural that 
America, England, and France were trying to preserve their gains, while 
Germany, Italy, and Russia were reviving as rivals. Japan would be 
foolish to ignore the facts of international life. 
Suetsugu also believed that the status quo powers had also extended 
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their oppression to Asia. Since the Chinese did not have the qualities 
needed to stand up together as a nation, Suetsugu said, the western powers 
were threatening to divide the continent up among themselves, just as 
they had done to the rest of Asia. The white powers were preserving 
peace at the expense of the colored nations and not through a just bal­
ance of interests and power; consequently, it was Japan's duty as the 
only colored nation remaining free to establish justice and lasting peace. 
Koiso and Ishiwara agreed. In 1940 Koiso argued that the French had 
retarded the economic progress of Indo-China by monopolizing trade and 
investment there while discriminating against Japan. In 1930 Ishiwara 
declared that Japan's ultimate mission was to destroy lithe pressure of 
the white race which is inhibiting our heaven sent mission .••• of saving 
the Chinese people.,,19 
To Kato and Suetsugu their first duty was clear: they had to pull 
down the prison walls of naval disarmament and liberate Japan's pro­
gressive conquering spirit. Just as the Meiji leaders had resisted the 
expansion of the west by modernizing and taking foreign colonies, the men 
of Showa would help their eastern brothers survive and prosper. Though 
Kato had been cast down from the seats of power in the naval bureaucracy, 
he and Suetsugu maneuvered relentlessly to rid their service of disarm­
ament advocates. By threatening to unleash the young officers and right­
wing assassins, they ':managed to sweep their opponents out in 1933 and 
replace them with their own followers, men like Osumi Mineo, Nagano 
Osami, and Shimada Shigetar~. Between 1934 and 1937 these men led Japan 
out of the disarmament system, accepted the Army's plans for expansion in 
China, planned an advance against the west's colonies in South East Asia, 
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and launched a spiralling naval race with England and America. 20 
The foregoing argument seems to lead back to an older picture of 
Japanese imperialism in which Japan's military masters plunged across 
Asia in a burst of emotional anti-western Emperor worship. But Kato and 
Suetsugu not only were traditionalists, but also modernizers who sought 
to make Japan the most modern military power in the world. From 1890 to 
1920 both men went to the west a number of times to bring back the latest 
in military technology and strategic thought. In 1897 Kato was a member 
of the crew which went to England to take charge of the new battleship, 
Fuji, which the British had built for Japan. And in 1919 he led a mission 
to survey the technical developments made by Germany. Suetsugu also 
went in person to study the destroyer and submarine tactics which western 
Admirals had developed during the World War. This reliance on the west 
for military ideas and technology must have proved galling for the proud 
officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy. 
By the mid-thirties, however, Japan was shaking off its dependence 
on western military leadership and asserting its independence. After 
1920 Japan's naval builders stopped relying on western engineering and 
between 1928 and 1934 Kato's disciples in the navy developed weapons which 
they believed would make Japan secure in the western Pacific against 
America. New midget and heavy submarines, better bombers and torpedoes, 
and most important, a, new super-battleship design made them confident that 
Japan could advance to the south successfully. Should America interfere, 
Kato and Suetsugu had elaborated a strategy which they expected to yield 
a Japanese victory. Given the great distance which the American fleet 
would have to travel from Hawaii to the Philippines, Japanese light forces 
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would have time to wear the American forces down by repeated submarine 
and air attacks. Finally, the Japanese main fleet could pick its time 
to close with the weakened Americans and use its superior battleship 
Od h ° 21strength to deC1 e t e 1ssue. To Kato and Suetsugu, then, it seemed 
that Japan was prepared materially as well as morally to build a bene­
volent empire. 
In spite of their professionalism, however, there is an undertow of 
tension running through their statements: anger at the politicians who 
agreed to end Japan's territorial growth; hostility against the white 
races' domination in Asia; and rage at the selfish economic practices 
of private enterprise. They urged Japan to get back to basics: a faith 
in Japan's national tradition and a return to the realism of the past. 
Most important, they asked their fellow citizens to remember that the god 
of war was a permanent, though uninvited, guest at the international 
banquet. But these latter day samurai worried not only about the dangers 
of the international scene, but also about the internal troubles of their 
homeland. 
A Disordered Realm 
To these men, society seemed increasingly out of joint in the twenties 
and thirties. Instead of an harmonious realm in which each citizen re­
mained in his station and loyally served the whole nation, new men had 
risen up to vie for individual profit and private power; economic growth 
had given the capitalists and their errand boys, the party politicians, 
real political influence. And in traditional eyes, of course, -public 
power used for private purposes was immoral. 
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The traditional Japanese ethic dictated not only proper political 
behavior, but also a special economic role for both government and the 
citizen. In the Tokugawa han all Japanese, whether their station was 
high or low, were supposed to pull together for the common good. Hard 
work would repay their debts both to their parents and to the Emperor. 
For its part the government would encourage the virtues of selfless 
diligence, harmonious cooperation, and thrift. The samurai officials 
would also be frugal with their tax money and invest it wisely to increase 
production and, therefore, add to the wealth of the whole realm. Since 
most men were not strong enough in character to follow the government's 
rules willingly, of course, the han officials would step in to discourage 
wasteful consumption; to the traditional man, reform meant cutting govern­
mental luxury and confiscating the estates of overfed merchants. 22 The 
citizens of the good realm, then, would strive to be miniature samurai-­
selfless, diligent, frugal, obedient, and cooperative. 
But as the twentieth century progressed, Japan was far from being 
a harmonious realm. In 1910 the Army leaders intervened directly at home 
to rebuild social order. Generals Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige helped 
to build the Imperial Military Reserve Association, which had 14,000 
branches enrolling three million members by 1936; auxiliaries for women 
and youth brought the total membership to approximately twelve million. 
The Army encouraged members of these groups to cultivate a spirit of 
loyalty to village, Army, nation, and Emperor, in order to prepare for 
23
local and national emergencies. With the onset of the depression, dis­
order mounted. In September 1935, Suetsugu declared that Japan faced an 
emergency. The foundation of the nation, the farmers, were rapidly grow­
ing poorer, and many common laborers were unemployed. Japan's growing 
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population was struggling to exist on a static economic base. But the 
emergency was not only economic--it was also spiritual. Gaps between 
the classes were widening, he warned, and communist agitation was grow­
ing. The solution for Japan '.s troubles, he said, lay in external econ­
omic expansion for which strong military backing was essential; the econ­
omic and colonial walls raised by the imperial powers would not fall before 
anything else. Yet the government was ignoring the plight of its people. 
The politicians spent their time struggling for power while the merchants 
were merely seeking to "pile up wealth without interference." Suetsugu 
warned that in the eighteenth century, the Dutch government had followed 
the advice of their merchants, disarmed, and inevitably declined, while 
their English counterparts had listened to the Admirals, built a great 
. 24 navy, and won a prosperous empLre. 
The lesson was clear: the government would have to rein in the mer­
chants and cast out the politicians. In 1938 Suetsugu was a member of 
the first Konoye ~abinet which was trying to introduce strict economic 
controls and prepare Japan for a long struggle to build an empire. He 
was outraged when Ikeda Seihin, the representative of the economic com­
munity in the government, urged invoking Article Six of the mobilization 
law in order to control the wages and movements of the workers while 
neglecting to mention the need for any controls on dividends. Both in 
the cabinet and in public, Suetsugu dema~dthat the government strictly 
limit private profits and also levy forced loans on private capitalists. 
But Suetsugu and the economic planners did not win; and in 1940, Koiso 
was still calling for an "end to the dealings of free competition" and 
full national management of the economy.25 In the eyes of these men, 
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Both Ishiwara and Koiso were impressed by Germany's defeat in World 
War I. German strategy had been good, and the Germans had used their 
interior lines well to concentrate their forces where they were needed. 
But in the end, the inferior generals and weapons of the allies had won 
the victory--simp1y by grinding the Germans down. Attrition was the rule 
in modern war, Ishiwara and Koiso reasoned, and a great power had to be 
self-sufficient both in war material and in financial resources. Ishiwara 
believed that Japan might have lost the Russo-Japanese war, if the Tsar's 
generals had understood the realities of the attrition strategy. Koiso 
was so impressed by the changing nature of warfare in 1917 that he began 
to plan for a war of attrition despite his relatively junior status on 
the General Staff. Using his position as head of the topographical 
section, he calculated Japan's resource reserves and then matched them 
against expected levels of consumption at full mobilization. He then 
surveyed the continental sources from which gaps in Japanese production 
might be filled. In the end he wrote a grab bag mobilization plan 
which covered a wide variety of Asian resources and included prescribing 
proper economic relationships, especially the restoration of "harmony 
between labor and capital." By March 1930, Koiso was so concerned about 
the lack of planning that he backed a coup in which his fellow officers 
hoped to establish a military government. But Koiso had risked his career 
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for naught--the plot fai1ed. 
Ishiwara shared Koiso's longing to plan for a war of attrition. By 
the late twenties, Ishiwara's studies of war history convinced him that 
Japan would have to expand and that it would have to adopt Napoleon's 
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strategy of making each conquered land supply the fuel for further cam­
paigns. In 1931, when he was on the Genam1 Staff of the Kwantung army 
in Manchuria, he took up the standard which had slipped from Koiso's hand. 
With the depression bearing down hard on Japan at home, with Chinese 
pressure on Manchuria rising abroad, and with the party politicians and 
capitalists under attack, Colonel Ishiwara and his fellow officers coldly 
planned, set off, and expanded the invasion of Manchuria. If modern 
economic planning could not begin at home, then it would start abroad. 
After a hard fight in Tokyo, the Kwantung Army won the right to rule 
Manchoukuo, and Ishiwara started to plan the new nation's economic develop­
ment. And the new Manchoukuo was a model of complete military control of 
a national economy. Japanese officers worked at all levels of the new 
state administration, and Japanese managers participated in hundreds of 
new joint ventures throughout the country. And all of these officers and 
bureaucrats danced to the tune played by the central administration of 
the Kwantung army. But Koiso, then Chief of Staff in the Kwantung army, 
and Ishiwara tried to see that the zaibatsu did not exploit Manchoukuo 
for private gain. 27 Economic planning would ease the way for the two 
nations and the military, but not for the merchants. 
Between 1933 and 1937 Ishiwara, Koiso, and others in the Army pressed 
the Japanese government to extend full economic planning from Manchoukuo 
to the entire Japanese empire and to acquire the resources which Japan 
still lacked. Their sense of urgency increased when Stalin reacted to 
Japan's advance in Manchuria and to the rise of Hitler by starting a 
large scale rearmament program. Though Koiso went into eclipse after 
1933, Ishiwara became the leading figure in the search for an integrated 
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Imperial economy; in 1935 he became head of the strategy section of the 
General Staff in Tokyo, and in 1936 he became chief of a new War Direction 
section of the General s·taff. As a result of his research in these pos­
itions, he soon decided that Japan's economic base was still too narrow 
and that Japan would have to gain access to the coal and iron of north 
China and the cotton and foodstuffs of south China. Consequently, he urged 
his superiors to adopt a policy of gradual penetration in China, and the 
Army leaders followed his advice by setting up new puppet regimes in the 
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north. 
At the same time, Ishiwara and economic planners from the South 
Manchurian Railroad Company were studying Russia's five year plans, in 
order to write a similar one which would integrate Japan's economy with 
that of Manchoukuo. By the spring of 1936 he had prepared a "Five Year 
Plan for Leading Industries" which covered many spheres of the new Imper­
ial government and economy. Ishiwara wanted the national government to 
abolish the political parties and establish a military dictatorship.29 
He proposed that the government control the capital markets, nation­
alize key industries such as electric power, automobiles, heavy machinery, 
and shipbuilding, and force the industrialists to hit targets set by the 
government. After a year of infighting, Ishiwara and the planners were 
able to have the Army present a curtailed version of their five year plan 
to the Cabinet in lat~ May 1937. 30 But the military and the leaders of 
the Konoye cabinet could not persuade the Diet to accept national mobil­
iz~tion until April 1938, and by then the Japanese government was enmeshed· 
in the China incident. Consequently, to Ishiwara's dismay, the govern­
ment had to de-emphasize investmentf~r developing greater industrial 
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capacity in favor of increasing immediate production in existing industry. 
By 1937 Ishiwara's power was waning. In 1931 and in 1935 he had 
helped to launch Japan on the parallel paths of continental expansion and 
economic planning, and in 1936-37 he again risked his career by facing 
against the mainstream. As Chinese resistance grew after the Sian inci­
dent in 1936, as Russian Production blossomed into weapons in the Far 
East, and as the western powers threatened a full scale naval race, 
Ishiwara began to doubt the wisdom of further immediate expansion. Ever 
the activist, in 1936 he resisted the Navy's plans for large scale building 
and an advance to the south, and in 1937 he fought against the Army's 
invasion of central China. It would take five years, he warned, to create 
the strength Japan needed for a long war with Russia, and another five 
years to prepare for a war against the western powers. But he protested 
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in vain and soon found himself exiled.
The East Asian League and The New Order 
Ishiwara's careful preparation of a modern economic base to support 
a large empire might lead one to conclude that he was a coolly rational 
leader. But there was another, more emotional side to Ishiwara, for he 
too was hoping to recreate a good moral order in Japan and Asia. Through­
out his career Ishiwara tried not only to ,lay the economic foundation for 
the Japanese empire, but also to overcome the tension between his tradi­
tional beliefs and his role as a modernizer. Like Kat~, Suetsugu, and 
Koiso, Ishiwara believed that Japan was duty-bound to defend and expand 
eastern spiritual values against western imperialism. 
But Ishiwara's version of eastern ethics had a special, millenial 
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twist. At the late age of thirty he converted to the Nichiren sect of 
Buddhism, and made up for his tardy entrance by typically vigorous 
preaching; in 1927 he converted a number of people with his powerful 
sermons. The followers of Nichiren comprised the smallest of the four 
major Buddhist sects in prewar Japan, but due to the special nature of 
their beliefs, they were among the more active religious groups in Japan. 
Basically, the followers of Nichiren believed that faithful repetition 
of a chant praising the Lotus Sutra would bring them salvation, but the 
pull of the doctrine on Ishiwara was far stronger than this simple formula 
for redemption. 
The teachings of Nichiren appealed both of Ishiwara's sense of duty 
as a soldier and to his pride as a Japanese, for they provided him with 
a great mission on behalf of eastern ethics. It was Ishiwara's task as 
a believer to emulate the Bodhissatva of Superb Action, just as Nichiren 
himself had done. According to the scriptures, Nichiren had found medieval 
Japan shrouded in the darkness of false Buddhist and Shinto beliefs, and 
he had dedicated his whole life to combatting error. The master had pre­
dicted that an age of even greater darkness would follow his persecution 
and death, but that a group of latter day saints would one day revive the 
faith. They would then convert Japan, reconcile the Emperor and his 
people, and unify the beliefs of Asia and the world. Ishiwara saw no 
need to separate his ;re1igious beliefs from his work as a military thinker; 
in one of his first studies he wrote, "Nichiren said, 'In order to accom­
p1ish the unification of re1igions .•..which is the fundamental condition 
for complete world peace, it will first be necessary for a single, epochal 
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war to occur in this transient world.'" 
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For Ishiwara, the tragic slaughter of the First World War proved 
that mankind was entering the final days of darkness which Nichiren had 
predicted, and he expected that a great conflict between Japan and Amer­
ica, the final representatives of eastern and western values, was "not 
far distant.tI During this destructive war, Ishiwara said, Nichiren had 
predicted that a good King would rise up, become a Buddha, unify Asia, 
and spread the law through the world. "None other than the Emperor of 
Greater Japan," he wrote, "will occupy the position of this wise King in 
the future world war." Despite the Buddhist framework, then, Ishiwara's 
beliefs echo Japan's traditional morality. The Japanese Emperor was the 
source. of all virtue, and it was the duty of his loyal servants to spread 
his light: 
By our inevitable victory [in the struggle] for the unification 
of eastern and western culture which is coming in the Pacific, 
we must promote in the world the great ideals which our nation 
has held since its founding, and our first and foremost task 
lies in carrying out this heaven-decreed work. In short, we are 
going to be victorious in the afore-mentioned world war simply 
because our heaven sent task is to save the people of the world 
[by acting] sincerely, without taking into account questions of 
our own profit or livelihood. 33 
For Ishiwara, Japanese expansion was a moral duty. 
Naturally, Ishiwara's outlook shaped his vision of the proper struc­
ture for the good empire. Japan would establish an East Asian League 
comprised of Manchoukuo, China, Southeast Asia, and Australia. As a 
first step, he said, the military should unify the homeland by aiding 
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the political parties which supported the League. After their domestic 
success, Japan's new leaders would then organize and streamline economic 
production in both the conquered areas and the homeland, thereby achiev­
ing "great progress for our industries and a great reform for China." 
All peoples in the League would look to the sage Emperor for spiritual 
guidance, while his servants in the Japanese military would bring the 
material benefits of the modern world to them. By saving Asia in this 
world, Ishiwara said, the Japanese would save themselves in the next. 
Ishiwara was serious about helping Asia: in the new Manchoukuo, 
he said, "Japanese and Chinese should stand in a position of complete 
equality. ,,34 And Manchoukuo--in large part Ishiwara's creation--would 
serve as a model for the rest of the League, since it was founded on good 
eastern principles: follow Heaven's way and bring peace to the people; 
Harmony among the Five Races; Kingly Way--Earthly Paradise; International 
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Harmony, etc. The Kings of the Asian nations would rule as Pu Yi, the 
King of Manchoukuo, did; they would be the loyal vassals of the true 
Emperor in Japan. This utopian vision appealed to Suetsugu as well. In 
October 1934, he endorsed the idea of an East Asian League. "What," he 
asked, "is the mission of our Japan? It is to accomplish the unification 
of eastern and western culture and bring peace based on justiceto the 
world. This is our ultimate goal." But it would be hard to create a 
peaceful world 'in one· jump," he said, and, therefore, Japan would first 
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have to bring harmony to the Orient and develop Asia's resources. It 
is clear, then, that these men were not merely careful economic planners 
nor cold eyed military strategists, but also latter day samurai driven by 
the desire ·to restore selflessness and harmony to Japan and Asia. 
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At the end of 1937, as fighting spread across central China, Suetsugu 
had a chance to strike a decisive blow for the East Asian League. In 
December, the cabinet of Prince Konoye Fumimaro faced a fateful decision: 
the Army's General Staff officers wanted to negotiate an end to the fight­
ing in China, in order to dodge the diffic~ task of invading southern 
China while maintaining a solid defense against the Russians in the 
north; Konoye, the field armies, and supporters of the East Asian League 
wanted to press on, destroy Chiang's government, and replace it with a 
federation of puppet regimes modeled on Manchoukuo. In order to counter­
act the counsels of the General Staff, Konoye brought Suetsugu into the 
government as Home Minister, and he expanded the Inner Cabinet to include 
him in the foreign policy debates. 
After his appointment, Suetsugu announced publicly that the moment 
had come to bring perpetual peace to East Asia. It might be necessary, 
he said, to expel white people from East Asia, in order to liberate the 
colored races and secure for them the benefits of equality with the white 
races. In the inner cabinet, Suetsugu sought to widen the war, make a 
complete break with Chiang and secure the recognition of the puppet 
regimes which the field armies were organizing in China. In the end 
Suetsugu's bright vision of the East Asian League blinded Japan's leaders 
to the reservations raised by the General Staff. On January 11, 1938 the 
Japanese government demanded that China join the coprosperity sphere, and 
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five days later Konoye broke relations with Chiang. 
After ten months of hard campaigning by Japan's armies in China, 
Konoye announced that the Kuomintang had been reduced to a local regime 
and that the time had come to establish a New Order in East Asia. The 
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new system would be an integrated confederation of East Asian regimes, 
each cooperating to improve the economic and political well-being of the 
bloc as a whole. No longer would China suffer from western imperialist 
exploitation; instead peace, harmony, and progress would reign as each 
nation looked to Japan for political guidance along the Kingly way, and 
economic direction along the path to modernization. Ishiwara's dream 
was taking shape. 
But before the enthusiasts of the Asian League could complete their 
task abroad, they first had to install the new order at home. Through­
out the thirties, Kato, Suetsugu, Ishiwara, and Koiso had been calling 
for national unity, harmony, and reform, but much to their chagrin, the 
politicians continued to squabble and the merchants doggedly resisted full 
mobilization even after the outbreak of the China incident. By 1940 the 
international crisis in Europe and the drive for internal harmony in Japan 
reached a linked crescendo. In August 1940, Koiso Kuniaki joined a chorus 
of voices declaring that the time had come to exploit the opportunity 
presented by the rise of the Axis powers in Europe. At home, Koiso said, 
all classes should unite in sinking their ,iindividual desires," and the 
new Konoye cabinet should dis~lve the political parties and undertake 
fundamental reform of the government and educational systems. 
Within three months Konoye had absorbed the political parties into 
the Imperial Rule Ass~stance Association (with Suetsugu as Vice President) 
and full economic mobilization began; Konoye had finally produced the 
controlled economy and harmonious political order for which Suetsugu, 
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Ishiwara and Koiso longed. In addition, as Koiso wished, Japan 
strengthened its connection with the Axis powers and expanded the title 
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of the New Order in East Asia to "The Greater Asian Coprosperity Sphere." 
But Koiso knew that this enlarged Asian League would have to include the 
western colonies in Southeast Asia if it were to be truly self-sufficient. 
And in the summer of 1940, the Konoye cabinet hesitated before risking 
war with the west. Once again it took an inside activist to harden the 
hearts of Japan's leaders for the fateful decision. 
The Southern Advance 
Just as he had risen to the challenge in 1930, Koiso was ready again 
ten years later. Koiso believed that the war in Europe provided an 
"epochal chance" for Japan to acquire the resources necessary to make 
self-sufficency possible. The surveys which he had begun in 1917 would 
have real meaning if Japan advanced south and acquired the oil, rubber, 
and tin of South East Asia. Therefore, as Colonial Minister under Hira­
numa and yonai in 1939 and 1940, Koiso acted as a partisan of both the 
Axis alliance and the southern advance. While still in the Yonai cab­
inet, Koiso embarassed the government by publicly denouncing Dutch oppres­
sion in the East Indies. 
In late July, the leaders of the new cabinet, Prime Minister Konoye 
and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke, considered sending Koiso as chief 
negotiator on a mission to the Dutch East Indies in order to secure in­
creased oil shipments peacefully. But Koiso continued his campaign for 
a full southern advance by military means. In a remarkable series of 
memos he called for the expansion of the East Asian League not only to 
the East Indies but through the whole western Pacific; Japan, he said, 
should plan: 
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the formation of an East Asian Economic League which would in­
clude not merely Japan, Manchuria, and China, but also French 
Indo-China, Thaila.nd, Malaya, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies; 
in the future we should also absorb North Sakhalin, the Maritime 
provinces [of Russia], the Philippines, and Oceania; finally, 
we should extend the boundaries of the economic sphere to the 
90th ....and l80th longitudes [Australia, New Zealand, the Gil­
berts, Midway, and the Aleutians]. 
Koiso concluded that the basic policy of the League lay in "uniting and 
synthesizing the entire economic strength of the various parts of Asia, 
establishing an independent Asian economy, and coping [thereby] with 
America and Europe." 
Yet Koiso did not believe that Japan's goals were purely selfish. 
By moving into Southeast Asia, Japan would liberate the oppressed colonial 
peoples in the western colonies. On the political front, Koiso said, 
Japan would substitute the Japanese Emperor for the Dutch Queen and the 
British King, but allow the natives to choose a ruler to mediate between 
their provincial governments and Tokyo. And gradually the natives would 
move closer to complete self-rule. In the interim, the Japanese Army 
would provide for internal order and self-defense, but the officers would 
be careful to respect local customs. On the economic front, Japan would 
set up a common market, establish bureaus of experts to plan development, 
and eventually integrate the economies of the colonies and the homeland. 
Eventually the East Asian bloc would be able to negotiate on the basis of 
equality with the western empires. 
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Koiso insisted that Japan start south immediately. If he were sent 
to the Dutch East Indies, he said, he wanted a fleet and an expeditionary 
force along to back him up. He would demand that the Dutch station Japan­
ese troops in the colony and integrate their economy into the economic 
league. And Suetsugu publicly supported Koiso's call for an early ad­
vance to the south. "Today, Ii he said, "is the world's warring states 
period," and in these dangerous days Japan had to acquire oil to ensure 
the security of the coprosperity sphere. But Koiso had once again sac­
rificed his immediate advancement to his vision. The General Staffs of 
both services insisted that a southern advance should only be undertaken 
after careful planning and full mobilization of Japan's economic and 
'I" , h 39m1 1tary m1g t. Konoye withdrew Koiso as his candidate for the mission. 
Yet in fact Koiso and Suetsugu had won. By the spring of 1941, both 
the rearmament programs adopted in 1936 and the economic planning which 
started in 1938 had provided Japan with a tempting, though temporary 
advantage over the western powers. In spite of the China incident, the 
Japanese Navy had built the midget and long range submarines, the light 
surface forces, the aircraft, and the super-battleships which it needed 
to carry out Suetsugu's attrition and ambush strategy. And the Cabinet 
Planning Board had ordered the stockpiling of key resources and had 
designated foreign material sources to provide for a war of attrition. 
With the Russians tied down by Hitler's invading armies, Japan was ready 
to move against the British, the Dutch, and--if necessary--the Americans. 40 
The long search for a good, harmonious, and secure empire, begun in the 
offices and studies of Kat~, Suetsugu, Koiso, and Ishiwara, ended when 
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Japan's planes struck at the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and at 
Hawaii. By 1942 the East Asian League was a reality. 
Conclusion 
Koiso, Ishiwara, Kate, and Suetsugu were typical of the men who made 
Japanese foreign policy during the thirties. They were not sword-swing­
ing fanatics, nor selfish tools of the capitalists, nor indeed farsighted 
military bureaucrats, but rather latter day models of the modernizing 
Meiji samurai. For the most part they worked within the system, but 
occasionally their consciences called them to take a public stand. When 
they did, they were remarkably successful: Kate and Suetsugu helped to 
force Japan out of the disarmament treaties and into a full advance in 
China and South East Asia; Koiso and Ishiwara succeeded in having succes­
sive governments adopt an aggressive continental policy, economic plan­
ning, and the ideal of an East Asian League. 
The constancy and tenacity of these men is striking. They worked 
hard to see that Japan had the most modern methods, strategies, and 
weaponry, even though they had to bring them in from the west. They be­
lieved that military and economic modernization would help Japan build a 
new order in East Asia based on the virtues which made Japan great: each 
citizen of the League would work diligently for the common good; each ruler 
would loyally follow the example set by the Emperor; mankind's debt to 
heaven would be repaid. The Emperor would show the way to peace and 
order in Asia and the world, just as he had done for Japan in the Meiji 
era. For the nation, western technology would help eastern ethics reign 
in Asia; for Kato, Koiso, Ishiwara, and Suetsugu, the good empire would 
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bind up the eastern and western halves of their hearts. Their dream ended 
badly, of course, for they had fatally misjudged both the likelihood of 
their own military success and the receptivity of their future subjects 
to the East Asian League, but their failure does not give us a license 
to misunderstand what drove the~nor to underestimate the seriousness of 
their purposes and the danger they posed to international stability. 
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